Signals in the Drone Age

The Electromagnetic Battlespace Has Changed

The war in Ukraine has fundamentally transformed modern warfare's relationship with the electromagnetic spectrum. What began as a conventional conflict has evolved into the world's first large-scale laboratory for drone warfare and electronic countermeasures. For signals intelligence professionals—and particularly those operating in reconnaissance roles—Ukraine offers both a warning and a roadmap.

The numbers tell part of the story. Ukraine now fields approximately 200,000 first-person view (FPV) drones monthly, with domestic manufacturers scaling production through distributed, hardened workshops that resist targeting. Drones account for an estimated 70-80% of combat casualties on both sides. The electromagnetic spectrum has become as contested as the physical terrain, with tens of thousands of jammers straddling the front lines.

But the deeper lesson lies in how rapidly the signals environment has evolved—and what this means for the future of tactical intelligence collection.

The Electronic Warfare Arms Race

Ukrainian electronic warfare capabilities have undergone a transformation that mirrors the broader innovation cycle driving the conflict. At the war's outset in 2022, Ukraine possessed limited EW capacity—primarily Soviet-era systems and a handful of domestic startups developing civilian drone countermeasures. Russian forces held significant advantages in spectrum dominance.

That disparity forced adaptation. By early 2024, Ukrainian forces had deployed layered jamming systems capable of disrupting standard FPV drone control links operating on 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz frequencies. Mounted EW systems on vehicles created mobile protective bubbles. Senior Lieutenant Ihor Shutyi, an EW company commander with Ukraine's 56th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, recalled the initial success: "Drivers reported how enemy drones dropped in front of their pickups, unable to withstand the jamming signal."

But the adaptation cycle accelerated. Drone frequencies diversified rapidly. By spring 2024, standard 900 MHz jamming modules proved insufficient. Russian drones began operating across 750-1050 MHz ranges. By autumn, countering them required seven separate jamming modules. The Kyiv-based firm Kvertus responded by developing Mirage intelligent jamming units capable of covering 0-6,000 MHz—but even this represented only a temporary advantage.

The Fiber-Optic Revolution

Late 2024 marked what Shutyi describes as a "turning point"—the moment conventional EW systems began to collapse. The cause: fiber-optic FPV drones. These systems trail 10-20 kilometers of hair-thin optical cable behind them, maintaining a physical connection with operators that renders radio-frequency jamming completely ineffective.

"There was, in fact, nothing to counter them," Shutyi admitted of the 2025 winter operations in Kursk Oblast. Russian fiber-optic drones overwhelmed Ukrainian logistics routes. By spring, FPV drones were reaching 10 km deep into Ukrainian-controlled territory—up from just 3 km months earlier.

The tactical implications extend beyond simple jamming resistance. Fiber-optic connections eliminate the radio horizon limitations that constrain RF-controlled drones flying at low altitude. Pilots can navigate through forests, urban terrain, and complex geography where radio signals would degrade or fail entirely. The direct connection reduces input lag and enables high-quality video streaming regardless of elevation or obstacles.

Perhaps most significantly for SIGINT operations: fiber-optic drones produce no electromagnetic signature during flight. They cannot be detected by direction finders. They cannot be located through electronic intelligence collection. Samuel Bendett, a drone expert at the Center for Naval Analyses, noted their tactical employment: "Since these drones cannot be jammed by electronic warfare, they're used as a first wave of attack to target adversarial electronic warfare and jamming capability." The signal hunters have become the hunted.

Understanding the Contested Spectrum

MCRP 2-10A.1, Signals Intelligence, defines the signals environment as ranging from 3 Hz to 300 EHz, with the radio frequency domain—where nearly all signals of interest reside—spanning 3 Hz to 300 GHz. Ukraine has compressed decades of spectrum evolution into three years, creating an environment where "asymmetric forces that lack robust and secure communications use new and emergent technologies to achieve nation-state-like capabilities to command, control, and communicate."

The Ukrainian drone ecosystem exploits this complexity. Standard FPV drones typically operate across multiple frequency bands:

Both sides have developed increasingly sophisticated approaches to spectrum dominance. Ukrainian firms like Kvertus have deployed MS Azimuth detection units capable of identifying drone control, telemetry, and other signals at ranges up to 30 km. The Pokrova EW system, operational since February 2024, uses GPS spoofing technology to confuse navigation devices on incoming drones—causing them to deviate from routes or crash harmlessly.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian engineers have developed the Chuyka 3.0 signals surveillance device for electronic intelligence operations, intercepting analog video signals from FPV drones. These systems represent the tactical edge of a broader signals collection architecture that mirrors—at accelerated timescales—the doctrinal framework outlined in Marine Corps publications.

The Reconnaissance Imperative

Small unit operations in denied environments require communications capabilities that can adapt to rapidly evolving spectrum conditions. The fundamental challenge Ukraine illuminates—maintaining command and control while operating in electromagnetically contested space—maps directly to the reconnaissance mission set.

Marine Corps doctrine emphasizes that "all members need to have a complete and thorough knowledge of the sophisticated communication equipment carried" when operating forward of conventional forces. This includes manual Morse code, long-range high frequency, satellite, multi-band, and digital communications. The Ukrainian experience suggests this equipment portfolio faces significant challenges in a saturated EW environment.

Direction Finding and Geolocation

MCRP 2-10A.1 identifies direction finding as a valuable tool for "finding and fixing transmitters used by people and systems of interest." In Ukraine, both sides have weaponized this capability at unprecedented scale. Russian forces employ passive sensors to detect drone control signals, then vector their own assets or fires to eliminate operators. Ukrainian forces have responded by developing systems that detect jamming emissions—then guide kamikaze drones directly to enemy EW installations.

The Ukrainian FPV drones equipped with radiation detection systems represent a particularly significant evolution. These systems scan 12 frequency bands during flight, calculate distance to emission sources based on signal strength, and use directional antennas to determine bearing. The pilot receives real-time data on jammer locations—then guides the drone to impact.

Marine Corps doctrine describes using multiple lines of bearing from different DF sites to triangulate transmitter locations. Ukraine has operationalized this concept offensively, with single drones functioning as mobile collection and strike platforms simultaneously.

Emissions Control and Survival

The fiber-optic drone revolution carries a critical lesson for forward operating teams: electromagnetic silence may become essential for survival. When a fiber-optic drone operator stated, "you are operating in total radio silence, so you cannot be detected by any radar system," he identified the inverse relationship between communications capability and survivability in the modern battlespace.

Traditional reconnaissance communications architectures assume some level of radio transmission is possible, with operational security achieved through frequency hopping, encryption, and burst transmission. Ukraine suggests this assumption may require revision. Teams operating in heavily contested EW environments may need to plan for extended periods of complete emissions control, with pre-planned reporting windows and contingency protocols that assume adversary direction-finding capability.

The Autonomous Horizon

Ukraine's adaptation cycle has not stopped at fiber optics. The next evolution—already being tested—removes the human operator from the terminal guidance loop entirely.

Auterion, a Swiss drone software firm, has deployed neural-network-driven optical navigation systems in Ukraine since December 2024. These systems allow drones to continue missions even when all radio and satellite navigation links are jammed. The drone navigates by visual recognition of terrain features, maintaining course toward targets without any electromagnetic connection to operators.

KrattWorks, an Estonian firm, expects that by the end of 2025, multiple companies will introduce fully autonomous solutions encompassing visual navigation, terminal guidance, and smart target recognition. "The operator would only decide the area where to strike, but the decision about the target is made by the drone," explains company executive Karl Meier.

This trajectory has profound implications for signals intelligence. Autonomous drones that navigate visually and make targeting decisions independently produce minimal electromagnetic signature during the engagement phase. They cannot be disrupted through traditional EW means. They represent a category of threat that falls outside the collection paradigm oriented toward communications intercept and electronic warfare support.

The Strategic Reality

Former Ukrainian commander Valeriy Zaluzhniy stated in April 2025: "The Russian-Ukrainian War has completely changed the nature of warfare... victory on the battlefield now depends entirely on the ability to outpace the enemy in technological development." His assessment centered specifically on drones, electronic warfare, and artificial intelligence.

The lessons from Ukraine's electromagnetic battlespace extend directly to expeditionary operations in any contested environment. The signals environment is:

Key Takeaways

1. Traditional RF jamming is approaching obsolescence against fiber-optic and autonomous systems. Electronic attack doctrine requires revision to address physically-connected and AI-guided threats.
2. Direction-finding capabilities have become offensive weapons. Any electromagnetic emission in contested space carries direct strike risk within single-digit minutes.
3. Communications planning for small unit operations must account for extended emissions control periods. Alternative reporting methods—physical, visual, pre-planned—require development.
4. National-to-tactical integration remains critical, but organic collection capability must adapt to environments where reachback may be denied or intermittent.
5. The pace of technological adaptation in Ukraine—design-to-deployment cycles measured in weeks—should inform expectations for future conflicts.

Further Learning